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The efficiency and availability of financial services for the poor is a global problem, and has only recently 
started to attract attention in South Africa. This paper aims to examine the South African microfinance 
industry by comparing sector-related differences in the ranking of specific problems. Tests for the 
significance of differences (in the location of specific populations) indicate significant differences in 
perceptions regarding certain intra-industry segments within the microcredit industry. The recent arguments 
in favour of a single regulator imply that the financial industry as a whole (commercial and microlending 
sectors) is homogeneous in its priorities. However, the results in this paper suggest that there is no significant 
agreement between the priorities of the commercial and microlending industries.  
 
 





The South African microcredit industry is relatively young 
and little is known about the real issues facing the industry 
due to limited research done on the sector. Although the 
commercial lending (that is banking) sector has been 
thoroughly researched, the micro-industry has not enjoyed 
the same level of investigation. This is mainly because of a 
lack of adequate data.  
 
Identifying key issues facing the micro-sector is always the 
first step towards any meaningful research and would enable 
regulators to focus on identifying and designing sustainable 
strategies.  
 
This paper presents primary data gathered from the South 
African microfinance sector in 2002. It investigates 
institutions that serve different market-segments, firstly in 
the wide lending industry and secondly within the 
microfinance industry. The investigation is done in terms of 
the priorities these institutions assign to specific problems 
experienced in the wider South African lending industry.  
 
The first area of investigation is the market-segmentation 
within the micro-industry (intra-industry comparison). 
Secondly, the paper compares the priorities of the 
microlending industry with that in the commercial banking 
sector (inter-industry comparison).  The latter is done with 
the sole purpose of discussing the proposed single regulator 
for all the levels in the South African financial sector. 
 
Market segmentation within the microfinance 
industry 
 
Managers of microfinance institutions (MFIs) report to their 
shareholders, financiers and sponsors and would therefore 
prefer to operate in the market with the highest return and 
the lowest risk features. In order to accomplish this, 
managers have a number of choices in terms of which 
markets to target (e.g. gender or income bias) and the kind 
of products they are willing to offer (e.g. loan-insurance, 
short- or long term loans, etc.). A number of authors (e.g. 
Chao-Beroff, 1999; Lok, 2000a & 2000b; Quiñones, 2000; 
Charitonenko & Rhaman, 2002) deal extensively with 
market-segmentation. These authors differentiate between 
urban and rural clients, group and individual loans and 
examine gender characteristics. Within the microfinance 
industry, each of these market-segments possesses distinct 
risk-return profiles.  
 
According to Chao-Beroff (1999: 22) rural areas offer 
considerably less return than urban areas. His research 
shows that low population density could result in a lender 
spending up to 20% of his income on reaching his clients. 
The incomes of MFI-clients are generally somewhat 
precarious and irregular, while long distances often separate 
the MFI from its clients. Significant investments are 
necessary to remove these constraints. These recurring costs 
make operating in rural areas more expensive than working 
in cities or big towns. 
 
Urban moneylenders have quite different problems 
compared to their rural counterparts and are more prone to 




competitors and clients. The large number of clients and 
high turnover of new borrowers mean that loan-
administrators seldom know the clients well. Consequently 
fraud becomes more of an issue and locating a person 
becomes almost impossible. 
 
The impact of fraud is diminished when groups can be used 
to protect the lender, i.e. the MFI. Collateral-free lending 
becomes possible (Quiñones, 2000: 13; Kiweu, 2002: 27) 
through group-pressure and group-guarantees. Often only 
one or two members of a group can make a loan at a time, 
increasing the pressure to repay the loan, while the group as 
a whole can be expected to take responsibility for bad debts 
in the group. This implies that costs can be reduced by 
shifting it to the group. Furthermore, group schemes bind 
clients to the groups and consequently to the MFI.  
 
However, even though group-based schemes have excellent 
repayment rates during good years, repayment rates are 
worse in crisis years (Quiñones, 2000:13). It also means that 
clients have to be trained to understand the schemes, at 
higher transaction cost to the MFI. Lastly, given that the 
lender-borrower relationship is virtually non-existent, it is 
not surprising that many clients prefer using individual 
schemes. Charitonenko and Rhaman (2002: 35) found a 
trend in Bangladeshi MFIs towards individual loans, but 
loan sizes still rely on historical repayment, making it more 
risky than Grameen1)-style loans. 
 
It has been widely documented that women are better clients 
than men (Lok, 2000a: i; International Labour Organisation, 
1996). Women are generally closer to their homes, are easier 
to organise and are easier to find for frequent visits by credit 
officers (Charitonenko & Rhaman, 2002: 34). Furthermore, 
women show stronger bonds to a group-scheme and are 
committed to preserve access to resources for their families. 
One would therefore expect to find a large proportion of 
MFIs lending to women, or even favouring female clients. 
This was indeed found to be the case in Asia (Lok, 2000a: 
11). In Bangladesh, women account for as much as 90% of 
MFI clientele (Charitonenko & Rhaman, 2002: 34). In Latin 
America, Lok (2000b: 9) found that the balance is more 
equal. She found that most financing institutions have a 
female membership of between 26 and 75 percent of all its 
clients.  Generally, Lok (2000a, 2000b) found that 
institutions with a larger number of small loans had a higher 
percentage of women as clients.  
 
Other segmentation criteria include criteria based on income 
and product-options, such as loan-insurance (Brown & 
McCord, 2000; Brown & Churchill, 2000). Although 
discussions surrounding these issues are common, none of 
the authors identify any risk-return characteristics. The 
questions that remain are whether it is more risky to lend to 
poorer clients, and whether value-added products such as 
loan-insurance prevent defaults or protect MFIs against 
losses. These questions will be addressed later in this paper. 
 
                                           
1) The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh is considered one of the best 
examples of a bank operating successfully in the microfinance field 
using group-based loans. 
Regulation of the microfinance industry 
 
The South African lending sector is a four-tier system, 
similar to that found in other developing countries, e.g. in 
East Africa (Masinde, 2001: 1). The South African Reserve 
Bank (SARB) operates as the banker of banks at the top 
level. The second level contains all commercial banks and 
the third consists of the microfinance institutions. As 
commercial banks try to enter the microfinance industry, the 
distinction between level two and level three becomes less 
defined. In South Africa it is more common to find 
institutions in level 2 (commercial institutions) that move 
down into level 3 (micro-industry) than vice versa. The 
main reason for the asymmetrical movement is the extensive 
capital-requirements needed to be classified as a bank. The 
fourth (bottom) level consists of informal finance schemes 
such as stokvels and other community based organisations. 
 
The third level institutions, i.e. MFIs, benefit from an 
exemption from the Usury Act. Microcredit institutions are 
not expected to keep the interest rates they charge below the 
interest rate ceiling that the commercial lenders must adhere 
to. This exemption was made as a result of structural change 
in the economy and did not originate from the South African 
Reserve Bank. 
 
Despite its role as regulator of the commercial banking 
sector, the Reserve Bank currently fulfils a limited role in 
the effort to bank the unbanked. The Microfinance 
Regulatory Council (MFRC) acts as regulator of the 
microfinance industry. This is different from a number of 
countries, e.g. the Nordic countries, Canada and more 
recently the United Kingdom and Australia (Financial Mail, 
2002a: 26-27), where one regulator oversees all types of 
financial institutions. The before-mentioned countries are all 
considered developed countries and have relatively 
homogeneous financial sectors. The Minister of Finance 
argues that South Africa has a well-developed financial 
system, and should therefore rather move towards 
unification of the regulators (Financial Mail, 2002a: 26-27). 
Based on his experience in East Africa, Ferrand (2001: 32) 
disagrees with this view. He suggests a tiered approach 
where the lower levels (NGOs/MFIs) are not regulated by 
the same institutions as the higher level institutions e.g. 
commercial banks.  
 
Although the South African banking sector is globally 
recognised as well developed, it is important to realise that 
the country is still regarded as developing in socio-economic 
terms. It is in many respects closer to a country like 
Bangladesh than it is to developed countries. Because of this 
link, the example of Bangladesh becomes relevant to South 
Africa. Charitonenko and Rhaman (2002: 42) suggested that 
Bangladesh should adopt a tiered approach to regulation of 
MFIs, with at least a distinct unit inside the central bank or a 
third party with regulatory powers. They base their 
suggestion on the limited expertise of the Bangladesh Bank 
in the field of microfinance.  
 
In South Africa, a number of commercial banks have tried to 
enter the microfinance sector but failed to do so [the 
collapse of Saambou and Unifer as well as the run on BOE 




14)]. When taken into account that the Reserve Bank acted 
as regulator in these cases, it is safe to postulate that it, like 
the Bangladesh Bank, lacks the capacity to regulate MFIs. 
Charitonenko and Rhaman’s (2002: 42) argument against a 
single regulator is therefore equally valid in South Africa.  
 
Whether the Reserve Bank should regulate the microfinance 
industry relies on whether MFIs face the same issues found 
in the commercial lending industry. The government created 
the formal microcredit industry and acknowledged its 
uniqueness in doing so, i.e. it is a separate industry with 
unique priorities. However, the recent movement towards a 
single regulator (Theobald, 2002: 24-25) would imply that 
the financial industry as a whole (specifically the banking 
and microfinance sectors) is homogeneous in the issues it 
faces. One would be able to test this assumption 
(homogeneous industry) if the priorities in dealing with 
these issues were known for both the commercial and 
microlending sectors. Unfortunately only the priorities of 
the commercial lending sector are known. In a report by 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (Metcalfe, 2002) a list of the most 
pressing strategic issues in the commercial banking sector 
was presented. The four biggest issues identified were profit 
performance, service quality, client focus and improving 
revenue growth.  
 
One of the major objectives of this paper was therefore to 
determine the priorities in the microfinance sector. How the 
priorities of the two sectors compared will be discussed later 




There is limited data available on the South African 
microfinance industry. In this paper, primary data is 
presented concerning the microfinance sector and its 
priorities. The population under study was South African 
microcredit institutions. A sample of 800 MFIs was 
randomly selected from the Micro Finance Regulatory 
Council (MFRC) database and questionnaires were designed 
and faxed to them. Fifty-three MFIs responded to the 
survey, implying a response rate of 6.6%.  
 
The issues listed in the survey were chosen from issues 
mentioned and discussed in depth by various authors 
(Metcalfe, 2002: 13; Masinde, 2001: 1; Lok, 2000a and 
2000b; Ahmed, 2002: 52; Rutherford, 2000a: 114; Naidoo, 
2002: 6). Using the categories suggested by Masinde (2001: 
1), the issues were split into the four levels considered as 
encompassing all issues, i.e. strategic, operational, 




Table 1: Problems/issues/challenges included in survey 
 
Collective group Problems/Issues 
Strategic issues • Increased competition a 
• Education level of staff b,c 
• Ownership structure unclear/donor intervention c 
• Legislation  and regulatory framework a,d 
• Skills development of staff b 
Operational issues • Quality of loan books (credit risk, delinquency and default) b 
• Profit performance a,b 
• High costs b,c 
• Attracting low-income clients (poor client response) a 
• Retaining existing clients a,b 
• Small and irregular cash flows from clients c 
• Poor selection practices c 
• Appropriate staff incentive schemesa 
• Low population density b,e 
• Fraud c  
• Service Quality a,b 
Marketing issues • Education level of clients f 
• Client focus a,b 
• Lack of information about clients d 
Capitalisation issues • Lack of capital to lend to clients (donor funding) b,d 
 
Sources: aMetcalfe, 2002: 13; bMasinde, 2001: 1; cLok, 2000a and 2000b; dAhmed, 2002: 52; eRutherford, 2000a: 114; fNaidoo, 2002: 6 
 
 
Methodology in ranking the issues 
 
MFI managers were asked to rank the issues in Table 1 
according to the extent to which they pose a problem in the 
particular MFI. The scale used ranged from 1 (small 
problem) to 4 (major problem). 
 
The data (which is non-parametric) surrounding each issue 
was used to calculate an average for the particular problem. 
Although these averages could be considered as rather crude 
statistics, they do offer the ability to rank the issues by these 
parametric averages. 
 
Methodology in finding market-related trends 
 
In order to compare different (intra-industry) market-
segments the data sets were filtered by income, gender, 




whether loans were granted to individuals or groups. The 
Kruskal-Wallis test was used to test for significant 
differences in the location between the different filtered sub-
samples. [Location could be described as the equivalent of 
an average, but for ranked (non-parametric) data. The 
Kruskal-Wallis test tells us when a data-set is consistently 
ranked significantly higher or lower than another data-set]. 
In the case of the Kruskal-Wallis test for a difference in the 
location of two or more groups of MFIs, the null and 
alternative hypotheses were: 
 
H0: The locations of the two or more populations are the 
same. (The two market-segments rate a problem from Table 
1 similarly.) 
HA: At least two populations differ in location. 
 
Methodology in comparing the microcredit and 
commercial credit sectors 
 
The proposed single regulator for the financial sector 
assumes that the different levels of service-provision 
(commercial and micro) are homogeneous in their priorities. 
To test this assumption the priorities found in the 
microfinance-survey had to be compared to the priorities as 
reported by Metcalfe (2002: 13). If it was found that the 
priorities correspond to a large degree, then one could argue 
that a single regulator might be able to increase efficiency 
through economies of scales and synergies. However, if the 
correspondence was low, there will be very little to gain by 
amalgamating the regulators into one.  
 
To test for correlation between the two levels, the Spearman 
rank correlation coefficient was used. The null and 
alternative hypotheses were specified as: 
 
H0: ρ0 = 0 (There is no linear relationship between the two 
variables.) 
HA: ρ0 ≠ 0. 
 
With α = 0.05 and n = 11 (eleven of the issues in the 
microfinance survey overlaps with similar issues in the 
report by Metcalfe), the rejection region for the two-tail test 
was rs>1.046.  
 
Findings and Discussion 
 
Priorities in the South African Microcredit Industry 
 
Respondents in the survey were asked to rank each of the 20 
issues in the questionnaire by the extent to which it poses a 
problem to the particular MFI. The ranked list shown in 
Figure 1 (more complete data available in Appendix 1) 
would be of interest to regulators and MFIs alike. It offers 
the opportunity to focus on solving the problems that may 
benefit the industry most. It is clear that the high cost 
structure in the microfinance sector is perceived to be the 
most pressing issue, followed closely by bad debts and 
precariousness of cashflows from microfinance clients. 
 
No investigation was made to determine the factors that 
contribute towards the high cost structure. It is a complex 
issue with numerous drivers, some of which are shown in 
Figure 1.  
Three major cost-drivers not mentioned in Figure 1 were 
identified using an open-ended question. The first is the lack 
of an efficient collection system to replace the old and 
illegal ‘card and pin2)’-method. In the absence of an efficient 
collection system, both the cost and bad debts increase. Of 
the top five issues in Figure 1, at least four are directly 
related to the absence of a good collection method. 
 
The MFRC lacks the power to act against illegal lenders 
while some registered MFIs feel over-regulated. Registered 
lenders complain about the high fees associated with 
MFRC-affiliation, without any obvious advantage gained 
from it. Unregistered lenders don’t pay any of these fees 
while exploiting clients. Yet the MFRC fails to demonstrate 
the capacity to act against these illegal lenders.  
 
Furthermore, reporting to the MFRC increases 
administration costs as well as the opportunity cost of not 
being able to carry out other productive tasks, e.g. visiting 
clients, training of staff, etc. Registered MFIs feel these 
factors give unregistered lenders an unfair competitive 
advantage. 
 
Trends found in the perceptions of the South African 
MFI industry 
 
By creating sub-samples within the bigger sample of MFIs, 
it was possible to study differences in location of certain 
intra-industry populations or market-segments. Table 2 
indicates differences in location at 10% ( ) and 5% 
significance ( ) levels. Appendices 2 to 6 report the 
statistical analysis surrounding the significance of 
differences in the location of market-segments. 
 
Groups vs. individuals 
 
It is generally believed that lending to groups rather than 
individuals should offer protection from several risks 
mentioned in the survey, e.g. high costs, the quality of loan 
books, low population density, etc (Kiweu, 2002; Lok, 
2000a & 2000b; Charitonenko & Rhaman, 2002: 34). The 
results from the survey indicate that individual loans are 
perceived to be significantly more expensive than using 
group-schemes. Yet on other attributes the ratings show only 
moderate differences in location. 
 
No significant difference in location was found in the 
quality of loan books, which was surprising as group-
schemes are often used to protect the lender against 
portfolio-risk. It could therefore be argued that group-
schemes are driven by the need for low-cost schemes rather 
than the need to reduce the risk-profile of the loan-books. 
 
 
                                           
2) The card and pin method refers to the practice of keeping a client’s 
bank-card as collateral and withdrawing the amount owed (by using the 
client’s secret pin) before returning the card. It is currently an illegal 








Education level of staff
Attracting low income clients
Client focus
Skills development of staff
Appropriate incentive schemes
Poor selection practices
Retaining exis ing clients
Lack of customer-information
Lack of capital to lend
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Small & Irregular cash flows
Quality of loan books
High costs
 
Figure 1: Average ratings as obtained in microfinance survey 
 
 
Although the literature-review indicated that borrowers 
ought to prefer individual schemes to group schemes, no 
such conclusion could be drawn from the survey. MFIs 
lending to groups do not perceive client satisfaction or 
service quality to clients to be more of an issue than MFIs 
lending to individuals3). On the contrary, it seems as if client 
satisfaction might even be less of an issue for MFIs using 
group-based schemes. Appendix 2 documents a complete 
summary of the analysis.  
 
Urban vs. rural 
 
By far the highest number of significant differences in 
location was found between MFIs operating in urban areas 
and those operating in both urban and rural areas (Appendix 
3). Five attributes were significant at the 10% level. These 
attributes were fraud, high costs, small and irregular cash 
flows, quality of loan books and increased competition. All 
five attributes were rated consistently higher in rural areas, 
reflecting a more serious nature. These issues explain, to a 
large extent, why MFIs prefer working in urban areas rather 
than in rural areas. 
 
                                           
3) Keep in mind that the survey recorded the perception from the 
supply side and not from clients themselves. 
Provincial trends 
 
In terms of differences in the perceptions in different 
provinces, the only issue that did show any significant 
difference in perception was ‘Legislation and regulatory 
framework’ (see Appendix 4). Of the three provinces 
analysed (Gauteng, Western Cape and Eastern Cape), the 
Eastern Cape rated this issue the highest. No explanation for 
this could be found, as these three provinces are all 




Providing loans cum insurance is not perceived to lower the 
risk of default. Neither does it reduce costs or increase 
profits. The absence of any significant differences4) is rather 
surprising, as it seems that offering insurance does not 
influence the perceptions surrounding costs, profits or fraud. 
                                           
4) A false positive test was obtained in the case of ‘increased 
competition’. The reported difference in location (Appendix 5) can be 
explained by the fact that the product-specific samples were further 
split into urbanisation-specific groups. As reported earlier, a significant 
difference exists between the two urbanisation-specific sub-samples, 





Based on the perceptions in the industry, there would be no 




In order to research the influence of income on risk-return 
properties, some noise had to be removed by dividing the 
sample of MFIs into a ‘rural and urban’ and ‘urban’ before 
breaking it into income-specific markets. This two-fold 
division effectively split the total sample into four segments 

















A         
10 percent level when a comparison is made between 
income-specific segments. These attributes are shown in 
Table 2. In all of the cases the difference in location is in 
favour of the higher income group, except in terms of 
information about clients.  
 
The analysis indicates that the low-income group itself is 
partly responsible for the unwillingness of the microcredit 
industry to lend to the very poor. Lower income groups are 
perceived simultaneously as more risky and less profitable. 
No prudent investor would consider lending to such a 
segment unless the mandate is solely aimed at poverty 
alleviation. 
 
Male vs. female clients 
 
Very few MFIs indicated making loans based on gender, 
deeming it impossible to make useful deductions regarding 
issue-related differences from the data. However, in itself it 
is somewhat surprising as a number of best practice models 
(Lok, 2000a & 2000b; International Labour Organisation, 
1996; Charitonenko & Rhaman, 2002) refer to women as 
lower risk clients. In this regard, the make-up of the South 
African microfinance industry differs completely from other 




















1 High costs       
2 Quality of loan books       
3 Small and irregular cash flows 
from clients 
      
4 Legislation and regulatory 
framework 
      
5 Fraud       
6 Increased competition       
7 Profit performance       
8 Education level of clients       
9 Lack of capital to lend to clients       
10 Lack of information about clients       
11 Retaining existing clients       
12 Poor selection practices       
13 Appropriate staff incentive 
schemes 
      
14 Skills development of staff       
15 Client focus       
16 Attracting low income clients       
17 Education level of staff       
18 Service quality to customers       
19 Ownership structure unclear/ 
donor intervention 
      
20 Low population density     a  
 
a Low population density shows a difference in location with a confidence level of 89,7%  
 
 




Comparison of microcredit vs. commercial credit 
industries  
 
In order to establish if the South African financial sector is 
indeed homogeneous, the priorities found in the 
microfinance survey was compared to the priorities in the 
commercial credit industry as reported by Metcalfe (2002). 
Table 3 shows an inter-industry comparison of the two 
survey rankings.  
 
The results in Table 4 indicate that the null hypothesis of no 
linear relationship between the two variables should be 
accepted. Even though both industries agree that ‘high costs’ 
is the most pressing problem, there is almost no agreement 
on the remaining issues. It therefore becomes difficult to 
justify a single regulator if the decision would be based on a 
homogeneous industry argument. A ‘mega-regulator’ 
(Theobald, 2002: 24-25) would not be able to manage two 




In terms of the issues in the microcredit industry, a clear list 
of priorities can be listed from the perceptions in the 
industry. However, it seems that problems such as efficient 
collection methods and the fee structure associated with 
MFRC registration should be added to the list of most 
pressing problems in the industry. The list of ranked issues 
should serve as guideline to legislatory and regulatory 
bodies in creating solutions that show maximum impact. It 
seems that the cost structure in the industry is a particular 
pressing issue, illustrated by the fact that 80% (Appendix 1) 
of respondents saw it as a problem that needs solving. 
 
Furthermore, it was shown that there are a number of 
significant differences in the perceptions of MFIs operating 
in different segments. Factors like income, the level of 
urbanisation and the use of group-schemes can have a 
significant impact on the efficiency of an organisation.  
 
The absence of trends in itself can be illuminating. MFIs do 
not perceive that group schemes reduce fraud or the impact 
of poor selection practices, even though this has been 
repeatedly cited in the literature (Quiñones, 2000: 13; 
Kiweu, 2002: 27).  
 
The market segment in the micro-industry with the best risk-
return profile is the segment excluding rural areas and which 
contains groups of higher income clients. To take advantage 
of the information presented, MFIs operating with the 
mandate to generate returns for their investors should target 
this specific segment. Whether to offer loan-insurance or 
other loan-related products makes no apparent difference in 
terms of risk-return properties. 
 
 
Table 3: Comparison between the PriceWaterhouseCoopers and microfinance surveys 
 
Description in microfinance questionnaire Position in 
Microfinance 
Survey 
Position in PWC 
Survey (2002)* 
Description in PWC questionnaire* 
Quality of loan books (credit risk, delinquency 
and default) 
2 8 Quality of loan books (credit Risk) 
Legislation and regulatory framework 4 6 Addressing new compliance and regulations 
Increased competition 6 10 Increased competition 
Profit performance 7a 1 Profit performance 
Retaining existing clients 11 4 Retaining existing clients 
Appropriate staff incentive schemes 13 9 Appropriate staff incentive schemes 
Skills development of staff 14 12 Recruiting/Training of front office staff 
Client focus (delivering what clients want) 15 2b Client focus 
Attracting low-income clients (poor client 
response) 
16 9 Building a client base 
Education level of staff 17 12 Recruiting/Training of front office staff 
Service quality to customers 18 2b Service quality 
 
*Source: Metcalfe, 2002: 13 
a By assuming that profit performance and high costs address the same issue, the end result does not change, yielding a correlation coefficient 
of rs = -0.1652 
b Client focus and service quality in the PWC survey was considered to be in a joint position. 
 
 
Table 4: Result to Spearman rank correlation test 
 
Correlation coefficient 0,087 
Test statistic Z = 0,275 
Two-tail P-value 0,833 
 
 
The issues experienced by the microfinance sector are not 
experienced at exactly the same levels by the commercial 
credit sector. It is clear from this piece that the South 
African government should be cautious about unifying the 
different financial boards into one if that involves managing 
them under the assumption that the whole sector is 
homogeneous. Although a rather crude comparison, the low 
agreement between the micro and commercial credit sectors 
indicate that the two industries are unique in their priorities. 
Therefore the South African government should strive to 
regulate the microcredit and commercial credit industries as 
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 population density 
Average rating 2.33 2.08 2.02 1.60 1.50 1.50 1.48 1.15 0.96 0.92 0.77 0.77 0.75 0.75 0.71 0.61 0.56 0.40 0.25 0.23 
                                          
Total Yes (% of responses) 79% 75% 77% 56% 67% 62% 58% 50% 31% 46% 40% 37% 44% 31% 31% 23% 25% 17% 12% 12% 
Total No (% of responses) 21% 23% 23% 46% 33% 38% 42% 50% 67% 54% 60% 63% 56% 69% 69% 75% 75% 85% 88% 88% 
                      
Rating = 1 (% of responses) 8% 13% 8% 2% 23% 10% 8% 15% 2% 19% 12% 6% 25% 6% 10% 4% 6% 4% 2% 4% 
Rating = 2 (% of responses) 17% 12% 29% 15% 19% 21% 17% 12% 6% 10% 23% 23% 10% 13% 8% 6% 12% 6% 6% 4% 
Rating = 3 (% of responses) 25% 33% 25% 23% 12% 25% 25% 15% 12% 15% 4% 6% 8% 4% 8% 10% 4% 6% 4% 4% 
Rating = 4 (% of responses) 29% 17% 15% 15% 13% 6% 8% 8% 12% 2% 2% 2% 2% 8% 6% 4% 4% 2% 0% 0% 
                      
Total number of responses 52 51 52 53 52 52 52 52 51 52 52 52 52 52 52 51 52 53 52 52 
Total number of responses not









Appendix 2: Results for groups vs. individual focus 
 
 







































Education level of your
clients



































































































































































=3.841 *Averages has very little meaning as the data is non-parametric. It is shown rather to give an indication of direction of differences
Chi-square
0.1, 1









































































Urban 1.200 0.800 1.200 0.400 1.000 0.800 1.400 0.800 0.900 0.400 0.600 1.200 0.600 0.800 0.600 0.300 0.300 1.000 0.000 0.000
Urban + Rural
(Both)






































































































































=3.841 Removed some noise by only looking at suppliers of consumption credit without insurance who serves individuals only
Chi-square
0.1, 1
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Gauteng (n=7) 2.714 1.714 2.000 0.714 0.571 1.143 2.429 1.857 0.571 0.429 1.143 1.714 0.429 0.857 1.167 0.857 0.857 1.714 0.286 0.286
W Cape (n=6) 1.333 1.667 1.833 0.000 0.333 1.500 2.500 1.667 0.000 0.000 0.500 1.500 0.333 0.167 1.500 0.000 0 500 1.167 0.000 0.000

































































































































































anage.2003,34(1)                                                                                                                                                                         25
Average
Q


































ducation level of your
clients
E
































1.81 1.06 1.06 0.25 0.63 1.38 1.88 1.44 1.00 0.38 0.44 1.00 0.38 0.50 0.63 0.44 0.44 1.44 0.00 0.13
Urban and rural clients,
consumption loans
with insurance
2.33 2.00 2.33 0.00 0.33 1.00 2.00 2.00 0.33 0.00 1.33 1.00 1.33 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.67 1.33 0.00 0.00
Urban and rural clients,
consumption loans
without  insurance
























































































































































































Education level of your
clients
E



























2.286 2.143 1.571 0.429 0.714 2.714 2.714 2.286 1.000 0.714 0.857 1.286 0.429 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.714 2.000 0.429 0.714
Above R799 (n=7) Urban
only











































































































































Below R800 (n=9) Rural
+ Urban
1.000 1.222 1.667 0.000 0.111 1 333 2.333 1.444 0.667 0.556 0.556 1.333 0.333 0.444 1.444 0.556 0.889 2.111 0.333 0.556
Above R799 (n=19)
Rural + Urban








































































































































Chi square 0.05, 1 =3.841
Chi square 0.1, 1 =2.705
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